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The University  and Agency  Partnership 
Initiative (UAPI)  of the Center  for  Homeland 
Defense and Security  conducted its first  ever 
Continental Security  Conference (CSC) on 
December  7/8,  2010 in  Colorado Springs. 
The event brought together  participants from 
Canada,  Mexico, and the United States,  and 
focused on  common  security  issues of 
interest to all three nations with an  emphasis 
on  academic perspectives and contributions. 
This report  provides background, a summary 
of the proceedings, and proposes a  way  ahead 
for this initiative. 
The genesis of the conference stems from 
the expansion  of the UAPI into the 
international arena.1 In  late 2009, the UAPI 
reached across the border  to Canada in an 
effort  to learn  of their academic programs, 
better  inform  our comparative homeland 
security  courses, and offer  Canadian 
programs the academic support  provided to 
UAPI partners domestically.2 After  that  visit, 
a  decision  was made to reach  out to Mexico 
as well, through  a  conference that  bought 
together academics, practitioners, and 
policymakers from  the three countries that 
share the North American continent.
The goals coming  in  to the CSC were 
straightforward. First was to develop 
knowledge and educate the participants on 
security  issues and academic efforts as 
undertaken  in  each  country.  Second was to 
build relationships between the participants 
and to begin  institutionalizing  those relations 
between their  organizations. Once the 
conference began, an additional  goal was 
added: to generate a  concrete list  of 
objectives for future conferences.
A t t e n d i n g t h e c o n f e r e n c e w e r e 
representatives from  academia,  including  two 
from  Mexico, four  from  Canada, and nine 
from  the U.S.  military.3 The Department of 
Homeland Security/Federal Emergency 
Management  Agency  (FEMA) and Public 
Safety  Canada  (PSC)  were among  the 
organizations representing  the practitioner 
community.  A  complete list of organizations 
represented at the conference is in  appendix 
A.
Despite the participant nations’ proximity 
to each other  and the nature of today’s 
natural and manmade threat  environment, 
few  long-term  initiatives of this type exist. 
None of these has a  primarily  academic 
focus. 4
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
The conference began with  a  keynote address 
by  Ambassador  Andres Rozental,  the former 
Mexican  ambassador  to the United Kingdom 
and founding  president of the Mexican 
Council on  Foreign  Relations. The address 
focused on  several  key  areas: shared security 
threats, increased cooperation,  criminality, 
and cultural differences.
The events of 9/11  were seen  by  many  as 
an  opportunity  to redefine the relationship 
between  the countries on  the North  American 
continent. Both  formal and informal 
discussions were conducted at the secretary 
of state level regarding a  “security  perimeter” 
that  included the entire continent.  However, 
the issue of sovereignty, particularly  for 
Canada,  was one of several issues that 
precluded making  much progress in  this area. 
Another  issue then,  as now, is the security 
threat  posed by  undocumented people in  all 
three countries.
There has been  gradual but  significant 
change during  the past  decade that  has 
increased security  cooperation, particularly 
between  Mexico and the U.S.  Evidence of 
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these changes includes visits by  secretaries of 
defense; a  “sea  change”  in  sharing of 
i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d l a w  e n f o r c e m e n t 
information; and an  increase in  formal and 
i n f o r m a l e x c h a n g e s ( h a v i n g  f i v e 
representatives from  Mexico attending this 
conference is one example of these 
exchanges).  Mexico’s formal  liaison  with  the 
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is 
also strong  evidence of increased cooperation 
and improved relations. 
The U.S./Mexican  border  continues to 
pose significant  issues.  The border, stated 
Ambassador  Rosental, is “insecure,  criminal, 
and dysfunctional, and on  the Mexican  side is 
an  inconsistent structure to deal  with  it.”  An 
effort  to identify  the issues and propose 
potential solutions was undertaken  jointly  via 
a  task force (which  Ambassador  Rozental  co-
chaired) consisting of representatives from 
the Pacific  Council on International  Policy 
a n d C o n s e j o M e x i c a n d e A s u n t o s 
Internacionales A.C (COMEXI). The report 
from  this task force,  Managing the United 
States-Mexico Border: Cooperative  Solutions 
to  Common Challenges,  focuses on  making 
the border  friendlier, more secure, and 
conducive to increased trade.  It  includes 
recommendations for  a  trusted traveler 
program, pre-clearance procedures for  both 
goods and travelers,  proposals for  furthering 
security  cooperation, and development  of 
more crossings and infrastructure.  The report 
has become a  key  document  for  political 
leadership in both countries.
Transnational crime has always been  an 
issue,  but  with  the tremendous level of 
growth  in  the recent  past,  it  has become a 
serious threat  to North  American security. 
The overwhelming majority  of crime is drug 
related,  and production, transport, and usage 
pose a threat  to all three nations. There is a 
sense that  too little emphasis has been  given 
to the problem  of drug use and demand. 
There is also general consensus that the 
transnational crime threat is currently  the 
greatest security issue.
Despite improvements in  relations, 
Ambassador  Rozental  pointed out,  “we still 
don’t know  each  other  well  enough; there 
remain gaps in  knowledge, perceptions,  and 
we clearly  don’t  understand each  other’s 
cultures.”  Knowledge gaps result in a  lack of 
trust,  and this has been amplified with 
Mexico because of corruption  issues. 
Portrayal in  the media  of a  Mexican  “culture 
of criminality” has hindered moving forward.  
Changes in  political administrations have 
also been  a factor  in  making  progress in 
terms of relations and security, the 
Ambassador  concluded; new  administrations 
take trust  backwards temporarily, so it  is 
important to institutionalize  relationships at 
the operational levels. 
The remainder  of the conference focused 
on  three issues or  questions: (1) what is 
continental security, (2) does continental 
security  matter, and (3)  how  can academia 
contribute to this issue? These areas were 
provided as starting  points only.  Each  major 
issue discussion began  with  a  primer, 
provided by  selected attendees, and was 
followed by  a  plenary  discussion. Then each 
question  was discussed in  breakout  groups, 
and each  group included attendees from  each 
nation.  Following are overviews of the 
discussions surrounding the topic in  both 
plenary  and breakout  sessions. Essays from 
selected primer  presenters are included in  the 
appendices. 
WHAT IS CONTINENTAL SECURITY?
The first  presenter, Rodrigo Nieto Gómez, 
pointed out that borders mean many  things 
and the first,  essential,  step to consider in 
“continental”  security  is to make explicit 
some of the differences in  how  the countries 
involved in this discussion filter  and 
represent  objective facts. A  summary  of his 
comments can be found in  his essay  “What is 
Continental Security? Avoiding  Getting  Lost 
in Translation,” in Appendix B. 
The second presenter  was David McIntyre 
of the National  Graduate School. McIntyre 
suggested,  “Continental  Security  is North 
American unity  in  promoting systemic, 
sustainable, well-being  of national  power  in 
the face of national  attack.”  His presentation 
highlighted talking  points of incentives and 
“words that  matter.”  This was instrumental  in 
understanding  that “attacks”  required a 
response and that  focusing  on  external 
attacks would miss some of the internal 
problems and the commonality  for  each 
country. By  disassociating  specific  issues 
such  as immigration  or  smuggling, a 
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framework for  cooperation  can  be established 
and advanced without the baggage of existing 
issues/competing  interests that  hinder 
meaningful holistic progress.   
Discussions of the question “what  is 
continental security”  focused on  several 
major themes.
First  was the concept  that  three nations 
combined and collaborating would obtain 
improved results over  individual efforts 
against security  concerns with  transnational 
consequences. While the threats were 
deemed to vary  somewhat between  nations, 
common  concerns include these major 
categories (listed without  ranking  or 
priority): pandemics,  natural or  manmade 
disasters (such  as the earthquakes or  the 
Deep Horizon  o i l  sp i l l ) ,  terror ism, 
transnational  illegal trafficking operations 
(drugs,  weapons,  people,  or  money), 
Weapons of Mass Destruction,  global 
warming/climate change/environmental 
issues, non-state  entities operating  within 
each  country,  and cyber  attacks.  Additional 
areas of concern were threats to critical 
infrastructure (i.e. electrical systems), 
f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m s a n d e c o n o m i c s , 
immigration,  farming/food security, and 
water  resources and rights issues. The threat 
posed by  the recent  H1N1  virus provided an 
ideal case for  study: analyzing  how  it  was 
handled by  each  nation, including  what  was 
done well and not  so well, could provide 
insight  into improving  cooperation and 
learning  from  each  others’ respective lessons. 
It was generally  agreed that  the number  one 
issue confronting  all three nations is 
organized crime.  
Second, participants agreed that  North 
American  security  must  be grounded in 
shared interests. It  was generally  agreed that 
the agenda  driving  shared interests has been 
focused more on  preventing  terrorist  attacks 
and largely  driven  by  U.S. concerns. There 
was overwhelming  consensus that  terrorism 
should perhaps be replaced as the driving 
factor  for  promoting  security  cooperation. 
Instead,  focusing on  the positive benefits of 
cooperation may  be a  more useful approach 
to moving  the agenda  forward because it  has 
more relevancy/impact  on  individual citizens 
(i.e.  economic impact)  and has universal 
political appeal.  It  was noted that  only 
thirteen U.S. citizens have died from  terrorist 
acts since 9/11,  yet hundreds of thousands 
have died from  automobile accidents and 
heart disease. 
The third point of agreement  was that 
actors other  than  governments also define 
continental  security.  For  example, the 
medical  community’s reaction  to H1N1 
transcended all  three borders and provided 
the basis for  the public health  response, 
which  in  turn  was supported by  each  nation. 
It is important to recognize the influence of 
the medical  community  in defining the 
threat, advising government, and responding. 
Incentives are critical in  creating  an  accepted 
definition  for  continental security. In 
addition to it being  important to those 
policymakers of each  nation  that are 
ultimately  responsible for  carrying out 
security  related activity,  the private sector 
benefits must be addressed as well.
Finally,  defining  continental  security  is 
complicated by  the fact that  a  concept of a 
North  American  identity  does not  exist.  The 
absence of a  political  and cultural  identity 
challenges widespread acceptance of the 
continental security  concept  because 
nationalism  and sovereignty  arguments 
p r e v a i l .  U n t i l t h e r e i s a  f o c u s o n 
interdependencies – such  as energy, 
agricultural  and economic production – a 
common identity  will be lacking  and the 
imperative to secure that  collective identity 
will be absent.  
In  summarizing  this session, Ambassador 
Rozental  pointed out that spending  excessive 
time on defining  terms is wasteful;  focusing 
on  processes to improve conditions for 
security  is more valuable.  Furthermore,  the 
goals of gaining knowledge about the subject 
matter  and connecting  with  fellow  colleagues 
and professionals far  outweigh  any  working 
definitions this workshop could create.
DOES CONTINENTAL SECURITY 
MATTER?
The primers for  this discussion  were provided 
by  Pamela Matthews (Public Safety  Canada) 
and David Schanzer  (Duke University). 
Matthews provided background on  Public 
Safety  Canada and suggested that, from  her 
perspective, the key  issues for developing  the 
continental agenda are driven by:
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• The interconnectedness of economies;  the 
U.S.-Mexican-Canadian  marketplace is 
among  the largest  in  the world, with 
billions flowing across borders everyday;
• Shared interests in  preventing  criminal 
activity  (drugs, human  trafficking, 
weapons smuggling, etc.), terrorism,  and 
radicalization;
• Publ ic sa fe ty  matters , inc luding 
emergency  management along  shared 
borders;
• Infrastructure matters: food supplies, 
e l e c t r i c a l g r i d ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , 
communications, etc.;
• Geography, proximity, and shared 
airspace/over flight concerns; 
• Common  governmental  obligations to 
protect  citizens’ safety  and well-being; the 
value placed on  democratic principles and 
maintaining  free/open  societies; and not 
improving security  at the expense of 
liberty and privacy.
Schanzer, whose essay  “Continental 
Security  – A  Skeptic’s View,”  is available  in 
Appendix C,  briefed that the threshold should 
be high  for  a  continental security  agenda 
because governments are already  stressed 
and only  limited additional efforts can  be 
supported.  Any  new  paradigm  must consider 
potential value and include only  issues that 
impact  and benefit  all three partners,  arise 
from  the geographic proximity,  and consider 
the positive and negative aspects of large 
scale economic integration.  
Much  of the discussion  surrounding the 
question  “does continental  security  matter?” 
revolved around Matthew’s and Schanzer’s 
advocacy  for  a  new  paradigm  that focuses on 
issues of mutual benefit,  shared values, and 
increased economic prosperity .  The 
participants agreed that  continental security 
should feature a privileged relationship – 
where each  nation  benefits more than others 
outside the group would – similar  to the 
concept  behind NAFTA.  Progress on  such  an 
agenda would serve to build trust,  increase 
the ability  to solve crises,  and keep lines of 
communication  open. Operationally, such  an 
undertaking  must  be politically  and popularly 
acceptable; it  must  show  that it  will improve 
upon  the status quo; the “low  hanging  fruit” 
should be the first  attempted; timelines for 
showing  success must be reasonable; and 
efforts must  fall  within  acceptable human 
rights policies and legal parameters.  Finally, 
the group felt  that  emergency  management 
and humanitarian  efforts of the recent past 
might  provide good models for  cooperation, 
particularly  in  light  of experiences in  the 
Caribbean and following Hurricane Katrina.
Participants generally  concurred that  it  is 
more critical in today’s security  environment 
to address mutual cooperation.  Foreign 
relations have changed since the end of the 
cold war; there is an increase in  the scope and 
volume of trade; and there is both  greater 
interconnectivity  and shared infrastructure, 
w h i c h  m a n d a t e r e n e w e d a t t e n t i o n . 
Additionally,  existing  policy  and programs 
are moving too slowly or are not working.  
Moving an agenda  forward will require an 
overarching set of guiding  principles all  three 
nations can  use to shape domestic policy; it 
cannot be dominated and driven  solely  by 
U.S.  interests.  Such  guidelines will help 
synchronize national  strategies and make it 
easier  for  leaders to sell initiatives to their 
domestic populations, particularly  in  Canada 
and Mexico.  Overarching strategies and the 
requisite political endorsements have been 
missing  in  the past, which  has led to some 
ineffective multinational programs,  waste, 
and frustration.  Examples of this,  and further 
reason  to support  this mutual effort, are the 
spillover  effect  of trade and the corruption  of 
the Mexican  government.  It was agreed that 
Mexico’s government must  be reformed in 
order to move forward with  a  trilateral 
agreement as external i t ies such  as 
corruption, pandemics, and drugs radiate 
outward and have an  effect on  the entire 
continent.  In  this context, it  would be  best to 
look at what is already  being  done: port and 
airport  security, movement of goods,  and 
response to pandemics were identified as 
three areas that clearly fit.    
Stephane Roussel (University  of Quebec) 
asked “how  do we face a  major  crisis without 
closing  the borders?”  Participants agreed that 
managing  issues without doing  so is critical 
as such  closures adversely  affect  the 
economy.  Any  event that  impacts all three 
countries must be examined case by  case, 
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issue by  issue,  while at the same time keeping 
a  broad view,  which  a  continental security 
effort could clearly help frame in advance.  
In  summary, there was strong agreement 
a  continental  effort  is important  and how  it  is 
framed is crucial. Synergies would result 
from  such  an  effort. An incremental approach 
that  moves forward with  a  unity  of vision 
would be best; not having such  an effort 
could clearly hamper cross-border issues. 
HOW CAN ACADEMIA 
CONTRIBUTE TO THIS EFFORT?
Academia has a  long  tradition  of helping 
government  solve its most complex problems. 
North  American  security  is no exception, yet 
to date the intellectual capacity  of Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States has not  been 
fully  energized toward solving  our  common 
challenges.  
The first  primer addressing  this question, 
delivered by  Roussel,  focused on what 
academia  is “good and not  good at.”  He 
suggested that academia can  be a  tremendous 
resource because it  excels in  several key  areas 
such  as documenting  data, conducting 
fundamental research  and comparative 
analysis, providing  historical  examples, 
testing  and evaluation, and identifying 
options.  Academia  can  also reach  across 
borders and be instrumental in  developing a 
transnational lexicon  that could help frame 
multilateral  discourse. Conversely, what 
academia is not  good at  is making 
predic t ions , making dec is ions ,  and 
implementing policy.  
The second primer, “What Contributions 
Can Academics Make to Continental 
Security?”  was provided by  Harold Trinkunas 
(Naval  Postgraduate School) and is 
summarized in  Appendix  D.  His overview  of 
what  academics can  do was highlighted by 
the notion  of nurturing  hemispheric  research 
by  shaping  panel discussions at  relevant 
professional conferences and sponsoring 
research. He further  suggested that  this 
forum  should determine how  to identify 
common research  topics,  what models are 
best  suited to sustain  research,  which 
networks need to be engaged,  and who 
should support  and sponsor  multilateral 
multiagency efforts. 
The participants concurred that  the focus 
of academia  should be restricted to what  it  is 
best at,  particularly  education  of both  policy 
makers and the public, research, and how  to 
draw  lessons from  past  historical data  and 
operational  experience. Academics can help 
frame the strategic communications message 
by  helping  the state department, minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  and other  government 
organizations.  Broadening  the network of 
stakeholders and extending the discussion 
will create momentum  and the imperative for 
action.5
 There are some potential negatives to 
using academia.  Ambassador  Rozental 
estimated that  – despite the contributions 
academics can  make – only  roughly  ten 
percent  of policy  makers are interested in  or 
open  to outside views; this may  account  for 
why  academia has not  been  engaged in the 
past. Preservation  of academic  independence 
is also an  issue; maintaining  objectivity 
during  the examination  of highly  politicized 
issues, such  as immigration policy, is vital  to 
p r o v i d i n g a p o l i t i c a l a n d s o u n d 
recommendations. Furthermore, academia 
generally  does not  work  quickly, as analytic 
research  is time consuming; it  requires clear 
objectives, which  government often  fails to 
provide; and there must be a  commitment  of 
resources.  In  al l cases,  expectat ion 
management is essential for all stakeholders.  
T h e f u n d a m e n t a l i s s u e s i n  m o s t 
government  to academia  relationships 
involve the lack of a  “common language,” 
poor  expectation  management, an  absence of 
established networks,  limited access to 
i n f o r m a t i o n a n d p e o p l e ,  a n d a 
misunderstanding  of academic  incentives. 
For  academic  involvement  to be effective, 
projects should be managed at  the lowest 
level  possible to encourage realistic  and 
practical  recommendations and findings. 
Nevertheless,  even  with  the expected benefit, 
RADM Ortega  (Mexican  Navy) commented: 
“The Mexican  government  does not  use the 
academic  community”  and conveyed that 
they would be unlikely to do so in the future.  
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CLOSING COMMENTS AND 
THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
The closing  group’s consensus was that 
academia  has much  to offer  in  strengthening 
Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. security  and 
cooperation. The following items were 
proposed as a  starting  point  for  moving  the 
Canadian-U.S.-Mexican  security  agenda for 
academia forward. 
• Per  Ambassador  Rozental’s suggestion, 
r e v i s e t h e C o n t i n e n t a l S e c u r i t y 
Conference name to “Canada-US-Mexico: 
Our New Common Security Agenda.”
• Disseminate, share, and improve access 
to cooperative efforts,  including  the use of 
social media  to expand the discussion  and 
reach more participants.
• Clearly  define the goals of this group and 
consider  formalizing  its propose with  a 
statement of principles.
• Broaden  the network; consider  who might 
be missing from the discussions.
• Establish  a  Center  of Excellence for  the 
study  of Canadian-U.S.-Mexican  security 
that  is apolitical and non-partisan, can 
reach out to other  institutions to 
collaborate on  research  agendas, will 
explore multinational  funding  sources to 
encourage dialogue,  will  encourage 
h e m i s p h e r i c  i s s u e r e s e a r c h  a n d 
publication, and can network with  and 
support interested stakeholders.
Closing  comments by  Ambassador 
Rozental  best  summarize key  points of the 
conference.  He saw  this as “an extraordinary 
event  that  brought  together  an  impressive 
group of people with  a  broad variety  of 
backgrounds,  and as a  genuine learning 
experience.”  The contributions academia  can 
make to our  joint security  are great, 
particularly  with  its ability  to think outside of 
the box  and to look  beyond the horizon.  As 
we move forward, we must  ensure that  we 
consider  security  in  other  areas, such  as those 
that  affect  our economies. We must  also 
ensure that  our trilateral  shield should not 
interrupt bilateral efforts,  but  focus on  those 
areas where three is better  than  two. As the 
three largest nations sharing the North 
American  continent, we can  only  benefit  by 
using  the concept  of “privileged”  relations to 
improve our overall security.
Finally,  perhaps the best summary  of the 
importance of this event,  and the need to 
continue such a  dialog, was made by 
Ambassador  Rozental to this author  in  a 
private comment:  In  the event of a  natural or 
manmade disaster,  the best thing  our  three 
nations can  do is “close ranks,  not close 
borders.”
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1 The Initiative has as its mission to expand and support U.S. based homeland security education and training 
programs.  The UAPI has supported program development in all fifty states, and has hosted dozens of conferences 
and workshops, including the Annual Homeland Defense and Security Education Summit held in the National Capital  
Region each spring.  Program support includes development of comparative homeland security courses – those which 
look at how security is conducted in other nations and learning of best practices, procedures, and lessons learned.
2 The visit to Ottawa included the University of Ottawa, Carleton University, and the policy office of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness Canada.
3 Representatives were present from the Mexican Navy, the North American Aerospace Defense Command/U.S. 
Northern Command, as well as from military schools, including the National Defense University.
4 The World Affairs Council has conducted an annual North American Forum, which brings together key thought 
leaders to interact for the “mutually reinforcing goals of security, prosperity and enhanced quality of life.” (http://
www.itsyourworld.org/wac/North_American_Forum.asp) The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 
was created in 2005 to conduct regional dialog on security and economic issues, and it also included Canada, Mexico 
and the U.S. (See M. Villereal and J. Lake, J., (2009) Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America: An 
Overview and Selected Issues, Congressional Research Service, 2009.)    This effort was initiated by the leaders of the 
three countries at that time (Paul Martin, Vicente Fox, and George Bush), but did not continue with their successors; 
the Partnership ceased to be active after August 2009. (See Pacific Council on International Relations, “Managing the  
United States - Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Problems,” 2009.) Several trilateral agreements 
exist, most notably the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as numerous bilateral accords, but 
none of which institutionalize regular gatherings to discuss security issues and the perspective of academia and its 
potential contribution.
5 Several ideas emerged to improve this forum in the future such as holding the next conference in Mexico or Canada, 
co-authoring papers within the working group, providing a historical perspective at the next event, and establishing a 
wiki site to encourage dialogue.
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APPENDIX B
What is Continental Security?  Avoiding Getting Lost in Translation
Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez
It is tempting to conclude that  thinking  about  continental security  only  requires from  us that  we 
move our  vantage point  one step higher, articulating  the “continental  dimension”  to the 
national, regional, and local scales.
The reality  is more complicated than  that. Borders represent many  things.  They  certainly  are 
artificial  or  natural lines in  the territory  that demarcate the point where jurisdictions, 
constitutions,  and authorities change.  Michel  Foucher describes the borders as “territorial 
discontinuities that  highlight  political divisions. In  that sense,  they  are  legal  institutions, 
negotiated or imposed, established by political decisions, and governed by the law.” 1
Nevertheless,  they  also possess an  aspirational  and imagined function  that transcends their 
important institutional nature.  They  are  the containers of geopolitical representations that give 
to the people who live inside those territories a  series of lenses and discursive frameworks that 
can  be and often are unique to them, creating  different  or  “alternate”  realities and priorities vis-
à-vis the same “transborder” facts.
Therefore,  borders are also the place where public discourse changes, sometimes radically.  As 
a  consequence, the first  essential step to consider, including a  continental scale for  security 
issues in  North America,  is to make explicit some of the most  important  differences in  the way 
North  American national subjective agendas filter  and represent objective facts. Only  then will 
we be able to “localize”  the national  interests and priorities of the three nations into something 
each  nation  can  understand using  its own lens.  Otherwise,  the concept of continental  security 
might “get lost in translation.”
I propose here a  series of exploratory  interrogations to guide us in  this quest. Finding some of 
their  multiple answers would allow  us to - if I might  continue using  the idiomatic  metaphor  - 
carve  our  own  trilateral Rosetta  Stone for  security  issues,  decoding  the multiple meanings that 
Americans, Canadians and Mexicans attribute to the same facts. 
This list  of questions is by  no means exhaustive,  and more could be included as these are 
answered. Nevertheless, they  seemed to me a good starting  point  to begin  a  continuous and 
emergent conversation.
1. Is there a real need for a continental or North American security framework? Why? 
2. Can  a truly  cooperative North  American security  framework even  exist,  given the enormous 
disparities in  the size  and scale of interests between  the United States, the only  current 
global superpower, and Mexico and Canada?
3. Can  we talk about  a continental  scale for  security  in  North  America  today, or  are we being 
fooled by  two bilateral  security  relations that sometimes pose as a  trilateral one: The 
Canadian-American  relationship (defined by  the strong  bonds that were forged thanks to 
NORAD) and the weaker  narcotized relationship between  the U.S.  and Mexico,  with  both 
relations pivoting around the United States and with  little practical contact  between  Canada 
and Mexico?
4. Is it  valid to talk  about  a  North American security  framework, if there are no North 
American security institutions?
5. Is the harmonization  of internal policies,  laws,  and regulations a  sufficient  response to North 
American  security  threats,  or should the North  American  nations move towards a  more 
formal and binding  security  treaty? Is this even  conceivable or  will their  respective public 
opinions stop any such a process?
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6. Is North  American  security  a  hegemonic construct put  together  by  the United States to 
impose its definitions of security  to the whole continent? Or is it  the opposite: a  framework 
that  helps sensitize the global superpower to the problems, threats, and vulnerabilities of its 
own world region?
7. A  core element  of the geopolitics of both “internal”  border  zones of North  America  is the 
presence of a  few  highly  active points of entry  that  measure just  a  few  miles, surrounded by 
large unpopulated zones where governance is scarce and situational  awareness hard to 
obtain  and expensive to keep. Can the three nations produce the necessary  agreements and 
assume the necessary  costs to protect those key  empty  territories and bring governance to 
them? 
8. Furthermore,  is it  in  the best  interest  of the three North  American nations to do this,  or  will 
competing  agendas and objectives make it  a  zero sum  scenario?  (E.g., border security 
between  Mexico and the U.S. would affect immigration dynamics, putting  pressure  on 
Mexican policymakers.)
9. Supranational regions are geopolitical  representations themselves.  Where does North 
America  stop? Can  a regional  security  policy  be built without the inclusion  of the Central 
American  and Caribbean  nations? If not,  wouldn’t  that  make the concept  of North  American 
security  redundant  or  unnecessary, in  light of this rediscovered version  of pan-
Americanism?
10. How  do the three nations deal  with  the “elephants in the room”  of the prior  relationships? 
Can  American  and Mexican  stakeholders overcome their  historical  mistrust  of one another? 
Can  Canada deal with  Mexico as an  equal partner at  the trilateral level  without  losing its 
special relationship with  the U.S.,  and without seeing  that relationship “Mexicanized”? What 
other kinds of reciprocal mistrusts are out there, waiting to hinder any coordinated efforts?  
11. What  is the role of American  homeland security  in  shaping  North  American  security 
interests,  and should Mexico and Canada  accept the fundamental objectives of this policy 
(e.g.,  critical infrastructure protection, border  security,  resilience,  and an  all-hazard 
approach  to threats)  as the unavoidable starting points for  their  own  domestic security 
policies?  Do they have to?
12. What  other  issues are important  for  Mexico and Canada,  and are not currently  part  of the 
respective American  bilateral  agenda with  these nations? Should any  of those be considered 
to be part of a North American security framework?
Most  of these questions have more than  one answer  and none is intrinsically  correct or  false. 
What  it  is important from  the point of view  of implementing  an  effective continental security 
policy  is to identify  which  of those different answers have clear  national cleavages and biases, 
thereby  dealing with  policy  “faux-amis” in  a  way  that inserts empathy  as a  core element of the 
dialogue. 
Ambiguity  and uncertainty  are not  the same.  Nikolaos Zahariadis rightly  observes that while 
“ambiguity  refers to a  state  of having  many  ways of thinking about  the same circumstances or 
phenomena. ...  [and it]  may  be thought as ambivalence,  ...  uncertainty  may  be referred to as 
ignorance or  imprecision.  Although  more information  may  (or  not) reduce uncertainty, more 
information  does not reduce ambiguity.” 2  Therefore,  ambiguity  will always be part of any 
continental security  framework,  as many  of the answers to the questions presented earlier  do 
not have a  definitive “objective”  answer.  However,  information  about  the distinct frameworks 
and lenses used by  the three nations of the continent  would certainly  reduce the level  of 
uncertainty, creating a more manageable negotiation environment for the three administrations.
Not all  conflictive issues have to be resolved at  once,  but  conflict  where it  may  exist  should at 
least  be understood,  to avoid what has probably  been  the most common  pitfall in  the North 
American security dialogue: Getting lost in bad national discourse’s translations.
SUPINSKI, ET AL, CONTINENTAL SECURITY CONFERENCE  10
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 15 (JUNE 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
About the Author
Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez is  a research professor in national security affairs and at the  Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security at the  Naval Postgraduate  School in Monterey, California. His  fields of 
research include border security, the  policy making process, the  implications of new technologies  for 
security and defense  policies, and the  geopolitical and strategic effects of homeland security/defense and 
national security with a regional focus on North America. Dr. Nieto-Gómez obtained his PhD (summa 
cum laude) in geopolitics at the  Institut Français de  Géopolitique  of the  University of Paris, from where 
he  also holds a master’s degree  in the  same  field. He also holds a Mexican J.D. from the  State  University 
of San Luis Potosí, specializing in international public and private law inside the NAFTA region.
Endnotes
SUPINSKI, ET AL, CONTINENTAL SECURITY CONFERENCE  11
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 15 (JUNE 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
1 Michel Foucher, L’Obsession des Frontières, translated from French by the author (Paris: Perrin, 2007).
2 N. Zahariadis, Ambiguity and Choice in Public Policy. Political Decision Making in Modern Democracies [Kindle 
version, 2003].
APPENDIX C
Continental Security – A Skeptic’s View
David H. Schanzer
“Continental  Security”  can  be a  useful concept only  if it  is narrowly  defined to encompass 
exclusively  issues where there is a  shared security  concern between the United States,  Canada, 
and Mexico that  can  be concretely  addressed through  joint action. There are already  a  plethora 
of multi-lateral forums in  which  both  physical and economic security  matters can  be addressed 
– the United Nations, the Organization of American  States, and NAFTA to name a  few,  and we 
have robust bi-lateral relationships through  which  many  issues can  be addressed.  We should not 
further  burden government officials with  another  institutional  framework that must be 
supported with  staff,  regular  meetings, and the like unless we can  articulate a  precise  purpose 
for  the new  institution  that is not  currently  being  met.  Canadians do not  have a  core interest in 
the problem  of Mexican  migration  through  the Arizona  desert.  Mexicans need not be involved in 
discussions about  shipping  lanes through  the Arctic.  Both  are security  issues. Both  have a 
geographical dimension. But neither should be the subject, to my mind, of continental security.
The types of security  issues that  might  benefit from  a trilateral, continental security 
framework are those that  (1)  substantially  affect  all  three nations,  (2) arise from  our  geographic 
proximity, and (3) require coordinated action by all three nations to address effectively.  
There are a number of issues that do rise to this level. 
The crisis created by  cross-continental  drug  trafficking  and the violence that spins out from  it 
is the prime candidate for  a continental security  dialogue.  Drugs are transported across both 
borders and continued violence and instability  in  Mexico caused by  the prevalence of highly 
organized and dangerous cartels could threaten  long-term  economic integration  of the three 
countries. Counter-narcotics efforts could be enhanced by  an institution  dedicated to developing 
and implementing  a  consistent,  coordinated strategy  to deal with  the complexities of the 
problem  from  both  the supply  and demand sides.  Regular  high  level meetings and staffing will 
help to sustain the focus, attention, and resources that this problem deserves.
Response to pandemic  disease is also a  critical  issue that could benefit from  coordinated 
activity  between  the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The SARS and H1N1  outbreaks 
demonstrate that  a problem  in  any  one of these countries quickly  and inevitably  becomes a 
serious problem  for  all  the others. There is a  need for  common  public health  protocols,  health 
screening  procedures at  the borders, and sharing  of expertise and information.  A  continental 
stockpile of antibiotics and vaccines that could be drawn  upon  to attempt  to isolate an  outbreak 
at  its early  stages should also be considered.  Perhaps the most important  subject of the security 
dialogue on  this issue would be to develop a  common  communications plan, so that leaders from 
all  three countries are delivering  a consistent  message to all inhabitants of the continent  to 
reduce fear and explain the elements of the response.      
Preparedness for  and response to catastrophic  natural disasters could benefit  from  a 
continental security  framework.  This could include planning  for  how  to deal with  cross-border 
infrastructure failures,  such  as if energy  supplies are disrupted by  disasters or  even  a terrorist 
attack.  Developing  a  means to quickly  deploy  response capabilities from  the other  countries to 
the site of the disaster should be a core topic of planning activities.  
Defining  continental security  to include immigration  and border  security  policy  is unwise and 
would have the likely  effect  of undercutting  support  for  the entire concept.  The question  of the 
disparity  between  the way  the United States handles immigration  and border  security  issues 
between  the Mexico and Canada  is a  hot  button  political  issue.  Placing  this matter  under  a 
continental security  umbrella  will  be perceived by  the U.S.  domestic  audience as a ruse to 
liberalize security  policy  with  respect to the Mexican  border.  Consequently,  it is a  political  non-
starter.  
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It is also difficult to see how  counterterrorism  could benefit from  a  continental security 
institutional  framework. Information  exchange is taking  place through  intelligence service to 
intelligence service. Muslim  radicalization  is not an issue in  Mexico,  but  it is in  the United States 
and Canada. Fears about  the Mexican  border  being a conduit  for al Qaeda  terrorists have been 
over-hyped. For  these reasons, it  is difficult to make the case that  a  continental dialogue on 
terrorism is necessary or would be useful.   
The one terrorism  related issue that  could benefit from  continental treatment  is cargo and 
supply  chain  security. Clearly,  goods crossing  the Mexican  border  can transit  right  through  the 
United States and into Canada.  It  simply  makes no sense for  the same goods to face a  different 
set  of security  requirements when they  cross the Mexico-U.S. border  as they  do when  they  travel 
into Canada. Harmonization  of driver  identification requirements and screening  procedures 
makes a  great  deal of sense. Ideally,  this should happen through  the NAFTA  process, but 
perhaps a  multi-agency  forum  like the envisioned continental security  apparatus could make 
more substantial progress than what has occurred to date. 
Since 9/11,  there has been a tendency  to make every  issue a  security  issue,  mistake 
procedural  reform  for  substantive resolution of issues, and pretend that new  bureaucracies will 
be more effective than  old ones. Eight  years into the experiment  of creating  the Department of 
Homeland Security  and six  years after  formation  of the Director  of National  Intelligence, the 
jury  is still out on  whether  these innovations have improved the problems they  were designed to 
solve.  I am  therefore a  skeptic about adding to the international institutions that are already 
present  to deal with  the challenges of our  post-9/11  world unless there is a compelling  case to be 
made for them.  
My  suggestion  for  those advocating for  continental security  is to start  slowly, perhaps 
identifying  a  single issue that can be managed through  a  continental  security  framework. 
Counter-narcotics is the obvious choice. If, after  a period of years, the parties believe a 
continental approach  has made a  valuable contribution  to this topic,  then  the scope of matters 
dealt with  through this framework  can  be expanded. If not,  it  can  be easily  discarded.  Until  this 
is applied on  a  small scale to see if it is useful, legislation  to create a  new  continental  security 
bureaucracy, with high level meetings, staff, office buildings, and the like should be put on hold.  
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APPENDIX D
What Contributions Can Academics Make to Continental Security?
Harold A. Trinkunas
What  can academics contribute to continental security? North  American  continental  security  is 
an  awkward concept  from  both  an  academic and a  policy  perspective. In  the traditional 
academic  disciplines concerned with the study  of national and international  security, there  is 
not a strong  tradition  of studying the North American  continent  as a security  issue in  and of 
itself.  Since the beginning of the twentieth  century, many  of the security  threats to the countries 
that  share North America  were either  perceived to have originated far  from  their  homelands or 
were issues of domestic security.  For  example,  since the 1940s the United States and Canada 
have shared a  security  identity,  but it is one that is centered on the North  Atlantic Treaty 
Organization  and focused largely  on  the defense of Europe (at  least until the end of the Cold 
War).  Mexico, on  the other  hand, has not  shared a  security  identity  with  other  North  American 
states for  well-established historical and political  reasons that  have not faded with  the increase 
of U.S.  concern  over  international terrorism  since 9/11,  the trafficking  of illicit  goods,  and cross-
border  migration.  As a result,  policy-makers (many  of them  educated in  the same disciplines as 
the academics studying  international security) have not  found a  broad body  of knowledge, 
research, or  policy  recommendations in  the academic community  dealing  with  North  American 
security. This can change if steps are taken  to foster  the emergence of a  community  of experts 
that  leverage existing strengths in  the academic study  of security  to develop the kind of 
knowledge that is common  (and helpful) when  it  comes to the study  of other  regions and 
security problems.
Academic disciplines are not  good at providing  short-fused responses to the most  pressing 
issues crowding  the inboxes of policy  makers. This is not the time horizon  on  which  basic or 
even  policy-relevant research  occurs. However,  what  academics can do is provide frameworks 
for  the systematic  analysis of problems and evaluation  of proposed policy  responses.  Given 
enough  time, this can  provide the policy  community  with  tools that  define both  the problem  set 
and the range of useful solutions,  sorting  through  the rush  of initial  responses to a  problem  to 
figure out what  works best.  Similarly, academics, in  so far  as they  may  not be vested in the 
preferred policy  option  of any  particular  government agency, have more latitude to think  outside 
the box  and avoid the self-reinforcing  echo chamber  that sometimes stifles debate in  the policy 
world.  Finally,  once a  body  of knowledge develops around a  problem  set, such  as North 
American  security,  academics can  provide the education and capacity  building  that  the policy 
community  needs to bring  its new  members up to speed in  preparing to deal  with emerging 
threats.
The benefits of academic study  of North  American security  are unlikely  to arise 
spontaneously  from  the normal workings of universities and think tanks. To focus academics on 
a  new  problem  and get them  working  on  building  new  knowledge requires new  resources.  The 
most obvious of these is funding  to support  research and build capacity  in  the academic 
community.  For  example, when the United States government  realized that  it  needed more 
researchers with  critical language and culture skills after  the Cold War, it  created the National 
Security  Education  Program  in  1991  to support  academics and professionals focused on  the 
regions and countries of interest  for  U.S.  national security. The other thing  the policy 
community  can  do to support the generation  of new  knowledge is provide access.  The 
participants in the policy  making  process are vital sources of information  about  emerging  issues, 
obstacles, and possible solutions to North  American  security.  This information  is grist  for  the 
mill of academic  research. Academic exchanges, discussions with  academics, participation  in 
conferences all provide venues where the two communities can communicate easily. 
We need to keep in mind that  the natural (and hoped for)  consequence of the academic 
process is publishing research  results.  Here,  the policy  community  can  be supportive by  keeping 
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an  open mind about  the kinds of publications that  matter  to academics, typically  those that 
appear  in  peer  reviewed journals and publications in  their  disciplines. While a  technical report 
may  be more useful to someone in  government,  attracting  the interest of leading  academics to a 
specific problem  set  means not  only  funding research  but also supporting  its publication  in  open 
sources rather  than allowing it  to be strangled by  pre-publication  review. After  all, these 
publications,  even  those that are critical of the policy  community,  attract  attention  from  the 
academic  world for  the issues associated with  continental security, and this new  area  for 
research will only benefit from a focus by more experts.
Policymakers can  also get  the best  support  from  academics by  offering  them  the opportunity 
to make a  difference,  not  only  by  developing new  knowledge but  also by  developing  capacity  and 
expertise. Students are the lifeblood of academic communities, and they  carry  the analytic 
mindset  with them  into jobs in  the policy  community. By  supporting  education  on  North 
American  security, the policy  community  will attract  the attention  of academics to this emerging 
issue, if only by generating a student-based demand signal.
However,  academics also have much  work  to do in  fostering  a  community  of interest  in  North 
American  security.  This involves listening carefully  to the problems that those in  government 
and in  the policy  community  have identified. It means communicating  results effectively, 
especially  to research  sponsors.  It  also means genuinely  engaging the subject  matter  of 
continental security  rather  than merely  repurposing  new  funding or  education  opportunities as 
a  mechanism  for  supporting  existing  research  agendas. Finally,  it  means creating  avenues for 
new  entrants into the study  of continental  security  to get  up to speed.  The Summer Workshop 
on  Military  Operations and Strategy, hosted by  Cornell University  every  year, was started in 
1997  as a  means for  senior  academics and policy  practitioners to attract  and support  the interest 
of graduate students and junior  academics in  military  affairs.  It has since evolved into an 
organization  with  a life of its own  that keeps the academic research  agenda  on  this subject 
moving  forward through  participation in  yearly  workshops and conferences.  This model may 
provide a  way  to bring the study  of continental security  into greater focus and attract  more 
attention for it from scholars and practitioners of security.
About the Author
Harold Trinkunas  is an assistant professor and the  associate chair for instruction in the  Department 
of National Security Affairs at the  Naval Postgraduate  School. His research and writing focuses on 
Latin American politics, particularly on democratization. His book, Crafting Civilian Control of the 
Military in Venezuela, was published in 2005 by the  University of North Carolina Press. He is also the 
co-organizer of the  Terrorist Financing and State  Responses in Comparative  Perspective  Project 
sponsored by the  Center for Homeland Defense  and Security. Professor Trinkunas received a PhD in 
political science from Stanford University in 1999.
SUPINSKI, ET AL, CONTINENTAL SECURITY CONFERENCE  15
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 15 (JUNE 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by  the author(s).  Homeland Security  Affairs is an academic 
journal  available free of charge to individuals  and institutions. Because the purpose 
of this publication  is the widest possible dissemination  of knowledge, copies of this 
journal  and the articles contained herein  may be printed or  downloaded and 
redistributed for  personal, research  or educational purposes free of  charge and 
without permission. Any  commercial  use of Homeland Security Affairs or the articles 
published herein  is expressly  prohibited without the written consent  of the copyright 
holder. The copyright of all  articles  published in  Homeland Security Affairs rests 
with  the author(s) of  the article. Homeland Security  Affairs is the online journal  of 
the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS).
http://www.hsaj.org
SUPINSKI, ET AL, CONTINENTAL SECURITY CONFERENCE  16
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 15 (JUNE 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
